Abstract-The total variation distance is proposed as a privacy measure in an information disclosure scenario when the goal is to reveal some information about available data in order to receive utility, while preserving the privacy of sensitive data from the legitimate receiver. The total variation distance is motivated as a measure of privacy-leakage by showing that: i) it satisfies the post-processing and linkage inequalities, which makes it consistent with an intuitive notion of a privacy measure; ii) the optimal utility-privacy trade-off can be solved through a standard linear program when total variation distance is employed as the privacy measure; iii) it provides a bound on the privacy-leakage measured by mutual information, maximal leakage, or the improvement in an inference attack with an arbitrary bounded cost function 1 .
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I. INTRODUCTION
We measure, store, and share an immense amount of data about ourselves, from our vital signals to our energy consumption profile. We often disclose these data in return of various services, e.g., better health monitoring, more reliable energy grid, etc. However, with the growing power of machine learning algorithms, the data we share can reveal more accurate and detailed personal information, beyond what we are willing to share. One solution to this problem is to develop privacypreserving data release mechanisms that can provide a tradeoff between the utility we receive and the information we leak. Denoting the data to be released by random variable Y , and the latent private variable as X, we apply a privacy-preserving mapping on Y , whereby a distorted version of Y , denoted by U , is shared instead of Y . Typically, privacy and utility are competing goals: The more distorted version of Y is revealed, the less information can be inferred about X, while the less utility can be obtained.
The information-theoretic view of privacy has gained increasing attention recently. In [1] , a general statistical inference framework is proposed to capture the loss of privacy in legitimate transactions of data. In [2] , the privacy-utility trade-off under the log-loss cost function is considered, called the privacy funnel. In a more recent work [3] , a generic privacy model is considered, where the privacy mapping has 1 This work has been carried out when the first author was with the Information Processing and Communications Laboratory at Imperial College London. This work has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) through Starting Grant BEACON (agreement No. 677854), and from the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) through the project COPES (173605884).
access to a noisy observation W of the pair (X, Y ). Different well-known privacy measures and their characteristics are also investigated in [3] .
We study the information-theoretic privacy in this paper. In particular, we measure the privacy-leakage (about the private variable X by revealing U ) by the total variation distance as
where p X|u and p X are the probability vectors corresponding to probability mass functions (pmf) p X|U (·|u) and p X (·), respectively. First, we characterize the optimal utility-privacy trade-off under this privacy measure for three different utility measures, namely mutual information, minimum mean-square error (MMSE), and probability of error. Then, we motivate the proposed privacy measure by showing that it satisfies both the post-processing and linkage inequalities [3] , and it provides a bound on the leakage measured by mutual information, maximal leakage [4] , or the improvement in an inference attack with an arbitrary bounded cost function 2 . Notations. Random variables are denoted by capital letters, their realizations by lower case letters. Matrices and vectors are denoted by bold capital and bold lower case letters, respectively. For integers m ≤ n, we have the discrete interval [m : n] {m, m+1, . . . , n}. For an integer n ≥ 1, 1 n denotes an n-dimensional all-one column vector. For a random variable X ∈ X , with finite |X |, the probability simplex P(X ) is the standard (|X | − 1)-simplex given by
Furthermore, to each pmf on X, denoted by p X (·), corresponds a probability vector p X ∈ P(X ), whose i-th element is
. Likewise, for a pair of random variables (X, Y ) with joint pmf p X,Y , the probability vector p X|y corresponds to the conditional pmf p X|Y (·|y), ∀y ∈ Y, and P X|Y is an |X | × |Y| matrix with columns p X|y , ∀y ∈ Y.
denotes the binary entropy function with the convention 0 log 0 = 0. Throughout the paper, for a random variable Y with the corresponding probability vector p Y , the
, and x ∞ max i∈[1:n] |x i |.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Consider a pair of random variables (X, Y ) ∈ X × Y (|X |, |Y| < ∞) distributed according to the joint distribution p X,Y . We assume that p Y (y) > 0, ∀y ∈ Y, and p X (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ X , since otherwise the supports Y or/and X could have been modified accordingly. Let Y denote the available data to be released, while X denote the latent private data. Assume that the privacy mapping/data release mechanism takes Y as input and maps it to the released data denoted by U . In this scenario, X − Y − U form a Markov chain, and the privacy mapping is denoted by the conditional distribution p U |Y . Let J(X; U ) ∈ [0, +∞) be a generic privacy measure as a functional of the joint distribution p X,U that captures the amount of (information) leakage from X to U . Hence, the smaller J(X; U ) is, the higher privacy is achieved by the mapping p U |Y . Also, let R(Y ; U ) ∈ [0, +∞) be a functional of the joint distribution p Y,U , and denote an applicationspecific quantity that measures the amount of utility obtained by disclosing U . Therefore, the utility-privacy trade-off can be written as sup
Minimum privacy-leakage is assured when X and U are statistically independent. This happens if and only if p X|U (·|u) = p X (·), ∀u ∈ U, or equivalently, the statistical distance between any p X|U (·|u)(u ∈ U) and p X (·) is zero. Intuitively, this motivates us to measure the privacy of a mapping p U |Y by the maximum statistical distance between p X|U (·|u) and p X (·), where the maximum is over u ∈ U. In this paper, we use the total variation distance between p X|U (·|u) and p X (·) to measure the privacy-leakage as in (1) 3 , i.e., J(·; ·) = T (·; ·).
III. THE OPTIMAL UTILITY-PRIVACY TRADE-OFF
In this section, we consider three utility measures and address the optimal utility-privacy trade-off problem when the privacy measure is given in (1).
A. Mutual information
Let m (X, Y ) be defined 4 as
Proposition 1. In the evaluation of (3), it is sufficient to have |U| ≤ |Y|. Also, the supremum is achieved in (3).
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A.
In the sequel, the optimal utility-privacy trade-off in (3) is characterized. To this end, we start with the special case of binary Y that admits a closed-form solution.
where
Proof. Let p Y |U (y 1 |u) be denoted by q u , ∀u ∈ U. From the constraint T (X; U ) ≤ , we have
which results in
Hence, m (X, Y ) is given by
(6) From the concavity of H b (·), we have 
Proof. LetS be defined as
and S be the inverse image ofS under the linear transformation P X|Y , i.e.,
It can be verified thatS is a convex polytope in P(X ), since it can be written as the intersection of a finite number of closed half-spaces (in P(X )) of the form
, where α i ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. The same also holds for its inverse image under the linear transformation P X|Y , i.e., S is a convex polytope in P(Y) written as the intersection of a finite number of closed half-spaces (in P(Y)) of the form 1] . Also, note the fact that S (∈ P(Y)) is a bounded set with a finite number of extreme points. An example of these regions is provided in [5] .
For a mapping p U |Y that satisfies the Markov chain X − Y − U and the constraint T (X; U ) ≤ , we must have p Y |u ∈ S , ∀u ∈ U. On the other hand, for any mapping p U |Y , for which p Y |u ∈ S , ∀u ∈ U, we can build the Markov chain X − Y − U , where T (X; U ) ≤ . Therefore, the following equivalence holds for mappings p U |Y :
This leads us to
where in (11) , since the minimization is over p U (·) and p Y |u rather than p U |Y , a constraint was added to preserve the marginal distribution p Y , which is already specified by p X,Y . Proposition 2.
In minimizing H(Y |U ) over p Y |u ∈ S , it is sufficient to consider only |Y| extreme points of S .
Proof. Assume that the minimum in (11) is achieved by N (≤ |Y|) points in S , which follows from Proposition 1. We prove that all of these N points must belong to the extreme points of S . Let p be an arbitrary point among these N points. p can be written as 5 
to the extreme points of S and p i = p j (i = j). From the concavity of entropy, we have
where the equality holds if and only if all of the α i s but one are zero. From the definition of an extreme point, if p is not an extreme point of S , it can be written with at least two non-zero α i s, which makes this inequality strict. However, this violates the assumption that the N points achieve the minimum. Hence, all of the N points of the minimizer must belong to the set of extreme points of S . Proposition 2, which is the generalization of (7), divides the problem in (11) into two steps: in step one, the extreme points of S are identified, while in step two, proper weights over these extreme points are obtained to minimize the objective function, H(Y |U ).
For the first step, we proceed as follows. We can write S as the union of the sets 6 that have the general form ofD = {x ∈ R |Y| |Ãx ≤ b, 1
Each of these sets is a convex polytope in P(Y) whose extreme points are the basic feasible solutions (see [6] , [7] ) of their corresponding set D = {x ∈ R |Y| |Ax = b, x ≥ 0}, where |Y| + 2 ≤ |Y| ≤ 2|Y| + 1. The procedure of finding the basic feasible solutions is a classical problem, which is omitted here due to lack of space. Further details and examples are provided in [5] . 5 The set S is an at most (|Y| − 1)-dimensional convex subset of R |Y| . Therefore, any point in S can be written as a convex combination of at most |Y| extreme points of S . 6 Each of these sets correspond to a specific sign determination of the elements in L 1 -norm.
For the second step, we proceed as follows. Assume that the extreme points of S , found in the previous step, are denoted by p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p K . Then (11) is equivalent to
where w is a K-dimensional weight vector, and it can be verified that the constraint (12) is met. The problem in (12) is a standard linear program (LP).
B. Minimum mean-square error (MMSE)
Assume that the utility is measured by the decrease in the mean-square error, i.e., the trade-off is given by
where the expectation is according to the joint distribution
In what follows, we show that (13) can also be efficiently solved through a linear program. We can write
where (14) is a classical result from MMSE estimation [8] .
From (10) and (15), we have the following lower bound for (13): 
C. Minimum probability of error
Another possible utility function is the error probability, which leads to the following trade-off
We can write
where (19) holds with equality when u = arg max y p Y |U (y|u). Then, (18) is lower bounded by 1 − max
It can be verified that max y p Y (y) is convex in p Y (·). Hence, following a similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 2, it is sufficient to consider only the extreme points of S in the optimization in (20). Therefore, the problem reduces to a standard linear program as follows:
where p mi is the maximum element of the vector p i , i ∈ [1 : K]. Once the LP is solved, if w * i = 0 (i ∈ [1 : K]), the value of u i is set as the maximum element of the probability vector p Y |ui = p i .
IV. MOTIVATION OF TOTAL VARIATION DISTANCE AS A MEASURE OF PRIVACY
The following three subsections motivate the use of total variation distance as a measure of privacy.
